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COMMENT
UPDATING ROMER V. EvANS: 1 THE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S DENIAL OF CERTIORARI IN
EQUALITYFoUNDATION OF GREATER
CINCINNATI V. CITY OF CINCINNATI
2
TMODUCTION
In Romer v. Evans,3 the United States Supreme Court invalidated a
Colorado constitutional amendment barring the state or any of its
subdivisions from granting homosexuals "any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.",4 The deci-
sion was celebrated by gay activists as their "first major Supreme
Court victory in the history of the republic."5 However, whether Ro-
mer becomes the seminal case for the gay rights agenda still remains
unclear. The Romer majority's brief and elusive opinion is, in the
words of one commentator, "as notable for what it did not say as for
what it did."6
'517 U.S. 620 (1996).
2 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997).
3 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
4 COLO. CONST. art. Il, § 30b. The amendment as a whole reads:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby ho-
mosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of per-
sons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or
claim of discrimination. This section of the Constitution shall be in all respects
self-executing.
Id.
5 Louis Michael Seidman, Romer's Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren Court
Activism, 1996 Sup. CT. REV. 67,67-68. Seidman notes that while the Warren Court did extend
First Amendment protection to some homosexually-oriented pornography, Romer marks the
first time the Supreme Court has recognized a discrimination claim brought by homosexuals.
Id. at 68 n.3 (citing Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962)).
6 Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and Democracy's Domain, 50 VAND. L. REV. 361, 376
(1997).
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In Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cin-
cinnati7 (Equality Foundation I/), the Sixth Circuit upheld a city
charter amendment,8 substantially similar to the Colorado initiative,
after the case was remanded by the Supreme Court for reconsidera-
tion in light of Romer. More importantly, the Supreme Court recently
declined to rehear the case.9 Given that Equality Foundation II was
initially derided as a "renegade ruling" and an "outrage" by both gay
activists and legal commentators, 10 the Supreme Court's decision
dismayed some but offered new hope to others who will almost cer-
tainly seek similar charter amendments in their own communities."
As of October 1998, Cincinnati was the only city in the country that
outlawed specific protection of homosexuals. 12
Increasingly, it seems "straight" America is reaching its limits in
accepting the gay rights agenda. 13  In recent elections, measures to
block same-sex marriages won overwhelmingly in Alaska and Ha-
waii, and in Fort Collins, Colorado, voters rejected a proposal to grant
gays and lesbians special protection from discrimination. 14 What is at
stake is the right to legally oppose a movement whose ultimate
agenda is to have both the American legal system and the society at
7 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997).
8 The amendment reads:
The City of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commissions may not enact,
adopt, enforce or administer any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy which pro-
vides that homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or relation-
ship constitutes, entitles, or otherwise provides a person with the basis to have any
claim of minority or protected status, quota preference or other preferential treat-
ment. This provision of the City Charter shall in all respects be self-executing.
Any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy enacted before this amendment is adopted
that violates the foregoing prohibition shall be null and void and of no force or ef-
fect.
Id. at 291.
9 See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 119 S. Ct. 365
(1998).
10 Mark Hansen, Distinguishing 2 from 3: 6th Circuit Panel Stands by Rights Initiative De-
spite Supreme Court Quashing of Similar Measure, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1998, at 35-36.
11 See Julie Irwin, Cincinnati Amendment Now in Effect, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 14,
1998, at As.
12 See id.
13 See Marc Peyser, Battling Backlash, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 17, 1998, at 50-51 (citing an ac-
cumulation of setbacks for the "gay rights" movement, including the military's "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy, Maine becoming the first state to reverse a statewide gay anti-discrimination
law, and the negative reaction of parents to the introduction of "gay awareness" curricula in
public schools as indicating that straight America may have reached "some kind of tipping
point, a limit to its tolerance for gays"); see also Schacter, supra note 6, at 369 ("[I]ncreasing
gay and lesbian presence in public life has triggered a powerful response from forces deter-
mined to reinforce the regime of invisibility.").
14 See Four States Deal Gay Rights Setback, AP ONLINE, Nov. 4, 1998, available in 1998
WL 21783023. According to a Newsweek poll, same-sex marriage is the most unacceptable
item on the gay rights agenda, with only 33% of the people polled supporting legal gay mar-
riage. See Peyser, supra note 13, at 51.
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large accord to homosexuality the same moral and legal status as het-
erosexuality.15 Nonetheless, most Americans still consider homosex-
ual behavior morally repugnant.'
6
Part I of this Comment discusses the cases that preceded Equality
Foundation II, and particularly the change in the Court's tenor to-
wards homosexuality from Bowers v. Hardwick17 to Romer. Part II
analyzes Equality Foundation Irs holding and the reasoning behind
it. Part III speculates on what impact the Supreme Court's denial of
certiorari has on the gay agenda and to what extent Romer's holding
is now more clear.
I. BACKGROUND
This Part first considers Bowers v. Hardwick, the reigning Su-
preme Court precedent with regard to gays prior to Romer. Next, the
federal district court ruling on the legality of the Cincinnati charter
amendment 8 is contrasted with the subsequent Sixth Circuit deci-
sion19 that reversed the district court (Equality Foundation 1). Third,
Romer is discussed, which resulted in Equality Foundation 1s re-
mand. Finally, the Sixth Circuit's Equality Foundation II opinion is
15 See, e.g., Andrew M. Jacobs, The Rhetorical Construction of Rights: The Case of the Gay
Rights Movement, 1969-1991, 72 NEB. L. REv. 723, 724 (1993) (asserting the task of the gay
rights agenda is "to move the center of public discourse along a continuum from the rhetoric of
disapprobation, to rhetoric of tolerance, and finally to affirmation"); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A
Social Constructionist Critique of Posner's Sex and Reason: Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda,
102 YALE L.J. 333, 375 (1992) (book review) ("[After gay activists deny the centrality of het-
erosexuality] the gaylega agenda then becomes something more than just our struggle for equal
rights to engage in sexual intimacy, marriage, and military service. Often in alliance with femi-
nism and critical race theory, gay, lesbian, and bisexual legal studies become one fulcrum for
shifting the norms that surround intimacy, marriage, and the military."); see also Jonathan Pick-
hardt, Note, Choose or Lose: Embracing Theories of Choice in Gay Rights Litigation Strategies,
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 923 (1998) (advocating Thomas Stoddard's theory that "gay rights"
must focus in the long term on changes in the law that are "culture-shifting," not merely "rule-
shifting").
The gay agenda is not without help from the current powers that be. For example, President
Clinton, at a November 8, 1997 Human Rights Campaign dinner, equated today's homosexual
movement to the struggle of blacks during the era of de jure segregation. William Bennett
replied to this assertion that "of course, if the gay-rights movement has, in fact, the status of the
civil-rights movement, there is a moral imperative to treat it similarly in every relevant regard-
school curriculum, adoption, marriage, and the like. President Clinton shies away from these
conclusions. But they are inescapable-if gay rights are the moral equivalent of civil rights."
William J. Bennett, Clinton, Gays, and the Truth, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 24, 1997, at 13 (first
emphasis added).
16 Of Americans recently polled by Newsweek, 54% believe homosexuality is a "sin." Pey-
ser, supra note 13, at 51.
17 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
18 See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417
(S.D. Ohio 1994).
19 See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th
Cir. 1995).
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discussed in depth, focusing particularly on the court's reasoning in
distinguishing its decision from Romer.
A. Bowers v. Hardwick20
At issue in Bowers was whether the Constitution conferred a fun-
damental substantive due process right upon homosexuals to "engage
in sodomy and hence invalidate the laws of the many States that still
make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time.",2'
The plurality opinion, delivered by Justice White, was concise in its
reasoning as to why no such fundamental right existed: it was neither
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"2 nor was it "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."3 White noted that
"[p]roscriptions against [this] conduct have ancient roots." 24 More
specifically, sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and in all
of the original thirteen states, in all but five of the thirty-seven states
when the Union ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, in all fifty states
until 1961, and in twenty-four states in 1986 when the case was de-
cided.25
Bowers is noteworthy also for a broader holding regarding
whether "traditional morality" alone could provide a rational consti-
tutional justification for a criminal law.26  In response to the argu-
ment that the mere popular belief that "homosexual sodomy is im-
moral and unacceptable" was an inadequate rationale to support the
criminal sodomy statute, Justice White asserted that the "law... is
constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing
essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process
Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed." 27
20 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
21 Id. at 190. The particular statute at issue was Georgia's criminal sodomy statute. It
reads:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any
sexual activity involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of an-
other....
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprison-
ment for not less than one nor more than 20 years.
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1996).
22 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S 319, 325-26 (1937)).
The right in question as framed by Justice White was narrower than that asserted by the respon-
dent Hardwick in his brief, namely, the right to "sexual intimacy." See Brief for Respondent at
10, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140).
2 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,503 (1977)).
4 id.
25 See id. at 192-94.
26 See Mark E. Papadopoulos, Note, Inkblot Jurisprudence: Romer v. Evans as a Great
Defeat for the Gay Rights Movement, 7 CoRNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 165, 172 (1997).27 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
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Bowers effectively foreclosed gay activists from claiming sub-
stantive due process privacy protection arguments in later cases. 
2
Bowers was cited by several subsequent circuit court decisions for the
corollary principle that homosexuals are entitled to no special treat-
ment under the Equal Protection Clause as either a suspect or a quasi-
suspect class because the conduct which placed them in that class was
not constitutionally protected.29 Bowers firmly entrenched the Su-
preme Court as the gay activist's "implacable foe-its decisions to be
feared, its jurisdiction at all cost to be avoided., 30
B. The Cincinnati City Charter Amendment and the Lower Court
Decisions in Equality Foundation I
In 1991 and 1992, the Cincinnati City Council passed two ordi-
nances prohibiting certain discriminatory practices within the city: the
"Equal Employment Opportunity Ordinance" 31 ("EEOO") and the
"Human Rights Ordinance, 32 ("HRO"). The EEOO prohibited dis-
crimination based upon sexual discrimination in city employment and
in city board and commissions appointments; the HRO did the same
for private employment, public accommodations and housing.33 The
HRO prescribed civil and criminal penalties for violators of its provi-
sions.34
Largely in response to the enactment of the HRO, a citizens group
was organized to place on the ballot an amendment to the Charter of
28 See Pickhardt, supra note 15, at 925 (calling Bowers the "culmination of a failed attempt
by gay rights litigators to append the right of 'sexual intimacy' to the laundry -list of substantive
due process privacy protections that the Court has elaborated since Griswold v. Connecticut");
see also Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-role
Stereotypes, and Legal Protection For Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 511, 512-
13 (1992) (observing that Bowers left gay activists scrambling to find new legal theories to
protect homosexuals from discrimination).
29 See, e.g., Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en bane) ("[I]f the gov-
ernment can criminalize homosexual conduct, a group that is defined by reference to that con-
duct cannot constitute a 'suspect class."'); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance
Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[B]ecause homosexual conduct can thus be crimi-
nalized, homosexuals cannot constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than
rational basis review for equal protection purposes.") (citation omitted); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh,
881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) ("If homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminal-
ized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than
rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes."); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d
1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[A]fter [Bowers] it cannot logically be asserted that discrimina-
tion against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm.").30 Seidman, supra note 5, at 68.
31 See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417,
421 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (citing Cincinnati City Ordinance No. 79-1991).32 See id. (citing Cincinnati City Ordinance No. 490-1992).
33 Both the EEOO and the HRO also prohibited discrimination based race, color, sex, dis-
ability, religion, national or ethnic origin, age, HIV status, Appalachian regional ancestry, and
marital status. See id.
34 See id.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the City of Cincinnati. 35  The group succeeded and the proposed
charter amendment, Issue 3, was placed on the November, 1993 bal-
lot. Issue 3 read:
The City of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commis-
sions may not enact, adopt, enforce or administer any ordi-
nance, regulation, rule or policy which provides that homo-
sexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or
relationship constitutes, entitles, or otherwise provides a per-
son with the basis to have any claim of minority or protected
status, quota preference or other preferential treatment. This
provision of the City Charter shall in all respects be self-
executing. Any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy enacted
before this amendment is adopted that violates the foregoing
prohibition shall be null and void and of no force or effect.3 6
After a "bitter and often inflammatory campaign," the charter
amendment was approved by a vote of approximately sixty-two per-
cent to thirty-eight percent. 37
After granting a preliminary injunction against implementation of
Issue 3 in a suit brought by the Equality Foundation of Greater Cin-
cinnati, Inc.,38 the federal District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio granted a permanent injunction.39 Judge S. Arthur Spiegel's
opinion represented a substantial, and highly controversial, departure
from Bowers and its progeny. First, Judge Spiegel admitted into the
record twenty-three findings of fact testified to at an earlier eviden-
tiary hearing that were largely slanted in the favor of the gay activist
Plaintiffs. Among these, the court accepted as fact that "[s]exual ori-
entation is a characteristic which exists separately and independently
from sexual conduct or behavior" 4 and, despite inconclusive scien-
tific evidence, that sexual orientation is "not only involuntary, but is
unamenable to change."4 1 By contrast, most federal courts up to this
35 See id. at 422.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 838 F. Supp. 1235
(S.D. Ohio 1993).39 See Equality Foundation, 860 F. Supp. at 417.40 Id. at 426.
41 Id. The following excerpt from a recent Newsweek article sums up the current scientific
thinking on the nature versus nurture debate regarding homosexuality:
In the early 90's, three highly publicized studies seemed to suggest that homosexual-
ity's roots were genetic, traceable to nature rather than nurture. Though the studies
were small and the conclusions cautious, many gay groups embraced the news.
We're born this way, they announced, don't judge us. More than five years later the
data have never been replicated. Moreover, researchers say, the public has misun-
derstood "behavioral genetics." Unlike eye color, behavior is not strictly inherited; it
[Vol. 49:645
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time had considered homosexuality to be a behavioral, and not im-
mutable, characteristic. 42
The district court focused on a purported fundamental right to
equal participation in the political process43 and equal protection.44
The court first found that Issue 3 did, in fact, bias the political process
in a fashion that made it more difficult for an "independently identifi-
able group of people," in this case homosexuals, to obtain the legisla-
tion they favored. 45 As such, Issue 3 had to be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest in order to stand,4 a threshold that
needs to be brought into play by a daunting complexity of environmental factors.
"People very much want to find simple answers," says Neil Risch, a professor of ge-
netics at Stanford. "A gene for this, a gene for that ... Human behavior is much
more complicated than that" The existence of a genetic pattern among homosexuals
doesn't mean people are born gay, any more than the genes for height, presumably
common in NBA players, indicate an inborn ability to play basketball.
Mark Miller & John Leland, Can Gays 'Convert'?, NEwsWEEK, Aug. 17, 1998, at 49. While
many scientists believe that homosexuality results from some combination of genetic and envi-
ronmental factors, biologist Evan Balaban admits, "I think we're as much in the dark as we ever
were." Id. For a discussion of the findings and shortcomings of the three scientific studies
linking homosexuality to genetics referenced in the excerpt above, see Pickhardt, supra note 15,
at 936-38, 946-48. See also David Gelman et al., Born or Bred?, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 24, 1992, at
46 (discussing the validity of a behavioral genetics study claiming to correlate common homo-
sexual behavior of fraternal twins as proof of possible genetic origin for homosexuality). Jona-
than Pickhardt lists at least three reasons why the belief of the immutability of homosexuality is
of great personal benefit to gays themselves: it allows gays to abdicate fault for being gay, giv-
ing comfort not only to themselves but also to parents, coworkers and the like; it counteracts
certain stereotypes about gays, such as that they actively recruit children into the gay lifestyle;
and finally, it condemns efforts to reform them. See Pickhardt, supra note 15, at 938-40.
As to the proposition that homosexuality is "unamenable to change," see Miller & Leland,
supra, at 47 (surveying homosexuals' efforts to change sexual orientation through therapy and
religious conviction). Certainly, the notion that a homosexual can come out of the gay lifestyle
and enter into heterosexual relationships, including marriage, is not popularly embraced by
either the mainstream media or gay activists. See, e.g., Focus on the Family, FAM. NEWS FROM
DR. JAMES DOBSON (Focus on the Family, Colorado Springs, Colo.), Nov. 1998, at 3 (observing
that a formerly homosexual staff member of the ministry who appeared with his wife on cover
of a Newsweek gay conversion article was "just torn to shreds by the media hounds for going
public with his story, as though he didn't have a right to tell his own experience").
42 See, e.g., High-Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573
(9th Cir. 1990) ("Homosexuality is not an immutable characteristic; it is behavioral and hence is
fundamentally different from traits such as race, gender, or alienage"); Woodward v. United
States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding "homosexuality is primarily behavioral in
nature").43 See Equality Foundation, 860 F. Supp. at 430.
44 See id. at 434.
45 Id. at 430. In finding such a broad right, the court relied on Supreme Court precedent
striking down measures that imposed special obstacles for African-Americans seeking legisla-
tion on their behalf. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (invali-
dating a statewide initiative that terminated the use of mandatory busing for the purpose of
racial integration); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (invalidating an Akron city charter
amendment which proscribed the city council from enacting a racial anti-discrimination ordi-
nance without the approval of a majority of the city's voters). The Supreme Court later declined
to apply this political process theory in invalidating Amendment 2, a Colorado constitutional
amendment similar to Issue 3. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,625-26 (1996).46 See Equality Foundation, 860 F. Supp. at 434.
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the court decided was not met.47  The court also found-again, con-
trary to other courts' conclusion on the matter-that homosexuals
constituted a quasi-suspect class.48 Issue 3 was thereby subjected to
"heightened" scrutiny,49 a test it also failed.50  Consequently, a per-
manent injunction was granted.
On appeal,51 the Sixth Circuit summarily rejected the district
court's reasoning:
Assuming arguendo the truth of the scientific theory that sex-
ual orientation is a "characteristic beyond the control of the
individual" as found by the trial court, the reality remains that
no law can successfully be drafted that is calculated to burden
or penalize, or to benefit or protect, an unidentifiable group or
class of individuals whose identity is defined by subjective
and unapparent characteristics such as innate desires, drives,
and thoughts. Those persons having a homosexual "orienta-
tion" simply do not, as such, comprise an identifiable class.
Many homosexuals successfully conceal their orientation.
Because homosexuals generally are not identifiable "on
sight" unless they elect to be so identifiable by conduct...
they cannot constitute a suspect class or a quasi-suspect class
because "they do not [necessarily] exhibit obvious, inimuta-
ble, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a dis-
crete group [.]r52
47 Among the arguments raised by the defendants which were rejected by the court were
that: (1) the government always has an interest in not imposing regulations upon private citi-
zens; (2) Issue 3 saves scarce public and private resources; (3) Issue 3 serves the purpose of "not
imposing a uniform, doctrinaire view concerning homosexual behavior on all segments of the
community"; (4) Issue 3 gives legal effect to Cincinnati's collective notion of morality; and (5)
Issue 3 protects and nurtures the nuclear family. Id. at 441.
4s As was noted earlier, courts following Bowers reasoned that homosexual orientation was
defined by conduct, hence classification as either a suspect or quasi-suspect class was unwar-
ranted. See supra notes 29, 42 and accompanying text. The district court in Equality Founda-
tion I, however, armed with the finding of fact that sexual orientation exists independently of
any conduct, concluded that Bowers and its progeny were not controlling and "therefore, [did]
not preclude a finding that gays, lesbians and bisexuals constitute a quasi-suspect class."
Equality Foundation, 860 F. Supp. at 440.
49 Under such scrutiny, a law must be substantially related to an important governmental
purpose. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,441 (1985).
5o The court found that Issue 3 was "unconstitutional under even the most deferential stan-
dard of review, let alone the most exacting." Equality Foundation, 860 F. Supp. at 444. Thus, in
the court's opinion, Issue 3 was not supported by any reasonably conceivable state of facts that
could provide a rational basis for the classification. See supra note 47.
51 See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th
Cir. 1995).52 Id. at 267 (citation omitted) (quoting Bowen v. Gillard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987)).
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As to the district court's finding that Issue 3 violated homosexu-
als' constitutional right to participate fully in the political process, the
circuit court countered that Issue 3 "deprived no one the right to vote,
not did it reduce the relative weight of any person's vote., 53  Issue 3
only proscribed the city council from enacting preferential legislation
for homosexuals qua homosexuals; it did not impair homosexuals
from seeking to repeal Issue 3 by another charter amendment, nor did
it prevent seeking relief through other political avenues, such as from
the Ohio state legislature or the United States Congress. 54  In the
court's opinion, the "narrow restriction created by the Amendment
... clearly [did] not rise to constitutional dimensions." 55
C. Romer v. Evans
56
Romer was decided soon after the Sixth Circuit issued its opinion
in Equality Foundation I. At issue in Romer was another voter-
initiated amendment, Amendment 2 to the Colorado Constitution,
prohibiting all legislative, executive or judicial action designed to
protect homosexuals from discrimination. The Colorado Supreme
Court invalidated Amendment 2 on the basis that it infringed upon the
fundamental right of homosexuals to participate equally in the politi-
cal process.58 The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted
53 Id. at 269.
SSee id.
55 Id. Because the circuit court found that Issue 3 implicated no suspect or quasi-suspect
class and burdened no fundamental right, it applied the "rational relationship" test-the legisla-
tion must stand if it is rationally related to any legitimate state interest. See id. at 270. The court
subsequently found that Issue 3 "potentially furthered a litany of valid community interests": it
encouraged associational liberty by eliminating exposure to punishment against persons electing
to dissociate themselves from homosexuals; it repealed an official municipal policy judgment
regarding homosexuality, thus returning the municipal government to a position of neutrality on
the subject; and it reduced governmental regulation's intrusion into the private social and eco-
nomic lives of Cincinnati residents, thereby increasing personal autonomy and reducing en-
forcement costs. Id.
56 517 U.S. 620 (1996).57 See id. at 624. The amendment reads:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of
its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact,
adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or
otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim
any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
This section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
COLO. CoNsT. art. II, § 30b.
58 See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994). In support of its political process ar-
gument, the Colorado Supreme Court cited the same United States Supreme Court precedent as
the district court did in Equality Foundation L See supra note 45.
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certiorari and affirmed the lower court's ruling, but did so on different
grounds than political process theory.59
The Romer Court based its decision upon equal protection juris-
prudence, but declined to engage in the "conventional" suspect/quasi-
suspect class inquiry.60 Instead, the Court took issue with Amend-
ment 2's scope, which it nullified legal protections for homosexuals
"in all transactions in housing, sale of real estate, insurance, health
and welfare services, private education, and employment.",61 The
author of the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy, observed that
Amendment 2 "has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group."62 A law making
it more difficult for this single group of citizens than for all others to
seek aid from the government was, in the Court's opinion, "itself a
denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense."
63
Despite the finding that Amendment 2 was a "literal" violation of
the plain terms of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court still applied
the rational basis test. Responding to Colorado's primary argument
that Amendment 2 furthered "other citizens' freedom of association,
and in particular the liberties of landlords or emploers who have per-
sonal or religious objections to homosexuality," Justice Kennedy
stated that the amendment's "sheer breadth is so discontinuous with
the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by
anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks a rational
relationship to legitimate state interests." 65  In other words, in the
Court's opinion, Amendment 2's scope was too expansive to even
rationally relate to the polica goal of respect for persons who have
objections to homosexuality.
" See Romer, 517 U.S. at 626. Why the Court chose not embrace the political process ar-
gument was not elaborated upon in the majority opinion. Louis Seidman posits a few potential
reasons why. First, the precedent itself was shaky, having been decided by sharply divided
courts. See Seidman, supra note 5, at 75. Second, the earlier cases never satisfactorily explained
the difference "between unfairly biasing the political process on the one hand and simply using
the process on the other." Id. at 76. Finally, the political process decisions were not obviously
on point, each having risen in a racial context. See id.
60 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-32. Justice Sealia noted in his dissent that the Colorado trial
court hearing this case had rejected the Romer Respondent's argument that homosexuals com-
prise a suspect or quasi-suspect class, and that the Respondents elected not to appeal that ruling
to the Supreme Court of Colorado. See id. at 640 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 629.
62 Id. at 632.
63 Id. at 633.
64Id. at 635.
65 Id. at 632.
66 Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (finding that "traditional mo-
rality" alone was a rational justification for a criminal statute because the "law ... is constantly
based on notions of morality"). Incidentally, the Romer majority did not once mention Bowers.
Jane Schacter notes that "[n]otwithstanding the notoriously forgiving quality of the rational
basis standard and the exceedingly rare judicial willingness to find laws wanting under it, the
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A related point the Court advanced was that Amendment 2 was a
"classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the
Equal Protection Clause does not permit."67 Matthew Coles interprets
the Court's statement this way:
A classification can never be justified by saying that it was
used to obtain the very discrimination that the classification
provides. Put another way, the government is not permitted
to say that the legitimate aim it is trying to achieve by treating
people differently is to treat these two different groups of
people differently.68
If true, this notion would undercut the legitimacy of a "mere disap-
proval of homosexuality" justification, implying that the government
must state what it hopes to achieve by a classification and not merely
the reasons why the classification was chosen.
69
Romer also weighed in on the issue of whether legislation favoring
homosexuals granted homosexuals "specia' rights or only "equal"
rights-i.e., the same rights enjoyed by all Americans:
We find nothing special in the protections Amendment 2
withholds. These are protections taken for granted by most
people either because they already have them or do not need
them; these are protections against exclusion from an almost
limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute
ordinary civic life in a free society.
70
Of course, this statement represents a value judgment not shared by
all Americans. The counterargument is that homosexuals already
have the same constitutional rights granted to them as any other
American, and, if a homosexual is a senior citizen or racial minority,
the same constitutional protections afforded all senior citizens and all
racial minorities. 71 Any law conferring upon homosexuals a favored
Court could find no justification for Amendment 2 other that anti-gay animus, and thus deemed
the measure irrational." Schacter, supra note 6, at 379 (footnote omitted).67 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (emphasis added).
68 Matthew Coles, The Meaning of Romer v. Evans, 48 HASTINGS LJ. 1343, 1348-49
(1997). Louis Seidman gives this example of a law which does not discriminate "for its own
sake": a statute which proscribes municipalities from enacting laws recognizing discrimination
claims against spousal abusers. This statute discriminates for the purpose of discouraging
spouse abuse, not "for its own sake." Seidman, supra note 5, at 101.
69 See Coles, supra note 68, at 1357 (asserting that in enforcing policies disfavoring gays,
states are "hard put to find any justification for what is done other than simple disapproval of
lesbians and gay men. Up until now, that has been all the state needed. Romer should change
that.").
70 Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
71 See id. at 644. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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status because of their sexual preference is one that grants a "special"
right.
72
Romer certainly indicated a shift in the Court's general disposition
toward homosexuality when compared to Bowers.73 But, because the
majority opinion relied more on "sweeping moral generalities" than
precedent and established legal doctrine,74 where the law now stands
is less certain. In particular, issues which remained unresolved after
Romer were whether a more narrowly tailored statute than Amend-
ment 2 could pass constitutional muster; 75 whether special preferential
rights given a more limited statutory scope could be distinguished
from general equal rights; 76 and finally, whether the rational basis
analysis the Court applied was the historically more-forgiving vari-
ety77 or something more stringent.
78
These issues were addressed by the Sixth Circuit in Equality
Foundation I179 not long after Romer was decided. As part of the
fallout of Romer, the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Equality Foundation I
was vacated and the case was remanded to the Sixth Circuit for re-
consideration in light of Romer.
80
72 See id.
73 Gay activists certainly held a different opinion of the Court after Romer. See, e.g., Co-
les, supra note 68, at 1357-58 (stating that compared to the "contempt," "disdain" and "scorn"
shown homosexuals by the Court in Bowers, the Romer Court "treats lesbians and gay men with
respect, and it treats our aspirations to equal treatment as legitimate").74 Seidman, supra note 5, at 69.
75 The Court in Romer continually spoke of the "sheer breadth" of Amendment 2---that it
prohibited all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government
designed to protect homosexuals-as most objectionable. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 635. It
appears that Amendment 2's too expansive scope simply extended beyond any legitimate justi-
fication.76 See id. at 631.
77 The party challenging the rationality of legislation under this test bears the burden of ne-
gating every conceivable basis for enacting the legislation, regardless of whether a supporting
justification was cited by, or actually relied upon by, the promulgating authority. See FCC v.
Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-15 (1993); see also Borman's, Inc. v. Michigan
Property & Cas. Guar. Ass'n, 925 F.2d 160, 162 (6th Cir. 1991) ("The burden upon a party
seeking to overturn a legislative enactment for irrationally discriminating between groups under
the e ual protection clause is an extremely heavy one.").
Consider the Court's application of rational basis review to invalidate a gender classifi-
cation in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). It was later admitted, albeit tacitly, by the Court in
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973), that it had actually applied a heightened
scrutiny analysis in Reed and would continue to do so in the future with regard to gender classi-
fications.
'9 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997).
80 See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 518 U.S. 1001
(1996).
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III. EQUALITY FOUNDATION I181
To uphold the Cincinnati charter amendment, the Sixth Circuit
faced the daunting task of distinguishing Romer. That it did, finding
that the "two cases involved substantially different enactments of en-
tirely distinct scope and impact." 82  The court noted that where
Amendment 2's broader language could be reasonably construed to
exclude homosexuals from the protection of every Colorado state
law,83 Issue 3 had no such "sweeping and conscience-shocking ef-
fect."84 This was because it (1) applied only at the "lowest (munici-
pal) level of government,"85 and hence not stripping homosexuals of
any rights derived from and enforced by the state, and (2) eliminated
only "'special class status' and 'preferential treatment' for gays as
gays under Cincinnati ordinances and policies, leaving untouched the
application, to gay citizens, of any and all legal rights generally ac-
corded by the municipal government to all persons as persons."
86
The circuit court further distinguished Colorado's Amendment 2
as particularly damning to homosexuals who lived within majority
pro-gay rights jurisdictions and who subsequently might have been
able to defeat city-wide anti-gay rights legislation in a local election.87
Because it was ensconced in the state constitution, Amendment 2
trumped any local political influence homosexuals might enjoy.88 By
contrast, Issue 3 did not hinder Cincinnati's homosexuals from seek-
ing its repeal through ordinary municipal political processes if they
could garner the public support required to do so.89 Moreover, Issue 3
did not prevent homosexuals from pursuing relief from every higher
level of state government "including but not limited Hamilton
County, state agencies, the Ohio legislature, or the voters themselves
via a statewide initiative."90
8' 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997).
"2 Id. at 295.
83 The Supreme Court noted in Romer that Amendment 2 could fairly be interpreted as not
only depriving homosexuals of the protection of laws passed specifically for their benefit, but
also as depriving them of the protection of general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary dis-
crimination in governmental and private settings. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 630-31
(1996). Still, dsepite the fact that homosexuals could find some safe harbor in laws of general
application, the Court still found Amendment 2 unconstitutional. See id. at 63 1.
84 Equality Foundation, 128 F.3d at 296.




89 See id. A provision of Cincinnati's city charter may be repealed by amending the charter.
See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 428
(S.D. Ohio 1994). To succeed, a charter amendment must receive the support of a majority of
voters. See id.
90 Equality Foundation, 128 F.3d at 297.
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In the Sixth Circuit's opinion, initiatives such as Issue 3 must not
be "cavalierly disregarded" 9' by the courts:
Patently, a local measure adopted by direct franchise, de-
signed in part to preserve community values and character,
which does not impinge upon any fundamental right or inter-
ests of any suspect class or quasi-suspect class, carries a for-
midable presumption of legitimacy and is thus entitled to the
highest degree of deference by the courts. 92
Construing Romer as neither forbidding purely local initiatives of
modest scope, nor as supplying any rationale for subjecting Issue 3 to
any equal protection assessment other than the traditional rational
basis test, the Equality Foundation II court then proceeded to deter-
mine whether some legitimate public interest was rationally advanced
by Issue 3.93 The court found at least one legitimate interest in both
the public and private cost savings by not having to litigate com-
plaints of sexual orientation discrimination. 94 While noting that other
public interests such as associational liberty and the expression of
community moral disapproval of homosexuality might also serve as
rational bases for Issue 3,95 the court declined to discuss these other
interests because the "conserving public and private financial re-
sources" interest alone was sufficient to find Issue 3 constitutionally
valid.96 Consequently, concluding that Issue 3 did not "disempower a
group of citizens from attaining special protection at all levels of gov-
ernment, but merely removed municipally enacted special protection
from gays and lesbians," 97 the Sixth Circuit again reversed the district
9 11d.
92 Id. For a discussion of Romer's analysis of whether homosexuals as a group constituted a
suspect or quasi-suspect class, see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
93 See id. at 300-01.
94 See id. at 300. The court referred to the United States Senate's rejection of proposed
legislation meant to eliminate sexual orientation discrimination in employment because it would
promote a "litigation bonanza." 142 CONG. REC. S9992 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Hatch) (commenting on Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 1995, S. 2056, 104th
Cong. (1996)); see also id. at S 10004 (statement of Sen. Coverdell) ("The bill virtually guaran-
tees an avalanche of costly litigation which could hurt small businesses most of all."); id. at
S9997 (statement of Sen. Nickles) ("A lot of individuals and a lot of firms would be sued based
on sexual orientation claims if this bill becomes law."); id. at S9989 (statement of Sen. Kasse-
baum) ("I do not believe... that we will promote greater tolerance in the workplace by relying
on more lawsuits and litigation as this bill would require").
95 The Sixth Circuit read Romer as not explicitly rejecting these proposed community inter-
ests as irrational bases for Amendment 2, but instead concluding that, "under the facts and cir-
cumstances of Romer, the state's argument in support of Colorado Amendment 2 was not credi-
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court's holding in Equality Foundation I and permitted the imple-
mentation and enforcement of Issue 3.98
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Equality Foundation II certainly
raised the hackles of gay activists and legal commentators. Most
claimed that Issue 3 could not be distinguished from Colorado's
Amendment 2 that was struck down in Romer.99 The two measures
were "virtual clone[s] ... and every bit as unconstitutional." 1°° They
charged that "the most conservative panel that could be put to-
gether" 10 1 did an end run around Romer's majority opinion in order to
validate again a measure they clearly thought constitutional in the
first place. Despite the derision Equality Foundation II was subjected
to, the Supreme Court let the decision stand. °2
A brief opinion by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Souter
and Ginsburg explained the Court's reasoning in declining to rehear
Equality Foundation II: 'This Court does not normally make an inde-
pendent examination of state law questions that have been resolved
by a court of appeals. Thus, the confusion over the proper construc-
tion of the [Cincinnati] city charter counsels against granting the peti-
tion for certiorari." 103 The confusion Justice Stevens spoke of was
whether Issue 3 "merely removed municipally enacted special pro-
tection from gays and lesbians,"' 4 as the Sixth Circuit held in Equal-
ity Foundation II, or, as the measure's opponents contended, barred
legal protections for homosexual citizens. 10 5 Justice Stevens took
care to mention that the Court's action should not be construed as ei-
ther an "independent construction of the charter" or as an "expression
of its views about the underlying issues" upon which the case was
based.1°6 Thus, while the Court did defer to the Sixth Circuit's find-
ing that Issue 3 did not implicate an equal protection violation, it con-
ceded it might have found differently on an independent examination
of Issue 3.
9' See id.
99 See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 10, at 35; David E. Rovella, Gay Groups Are Angry at Sex-
ual Preference Ruling, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 10, 1997, at A9.
10 Hansen, supra note 10, at 35-36 (quoting Suzanne Goldberg, staff lawyer for the
Lambda Legal Defense Fund and co-counsel for the Plaintiffs in Equality Foundation 11).
101 Rovella, supra note 99, at A9 (quoting constitutional law Professor Melvyn R.
Durchslag, Case Western Reserve University School of Law). The panel was composed of two
Reagan appointees, Judges Robert B. Krupansky and Alan E. Norris, and Carter appointee
Cornelia G. Kennedy. See id.
102 See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 119 S. Ct. 365
(1998) (Stevens, J., explaining denial of certiorari).
103 Id. at 366 (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341,346-47 (1976)).
104 Id. at 365 (quoting Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128
F.3d 289, 301 (6th Cir. 1997)).
'
05 See id. at 366.
106id.
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IV. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION IN
DENYING CERTIORARI TO EQUALITY FOUNDATION II, WHERE ROMER
Now STANDS, AND "PREVENTING THE PIECEMEAL DETERIORATION
OF SEXUAL MORALITY"107
While not definitively settling this area of the law as either af-
firming or reversing the Sixth Circuit would have done, the decision
not to review Equality Foundation II does suggest some answers to
the unresolved questions raised by Romer.108 Most importantly, the
Court seems to have recognized that at least for the short term, legis-
lative initiatives narrower in scope than Colorado's Amendment 2 and
tied to a legitimate public interest may be found constitutional. 109
Lower courts forced to interpret Romer, if and when the situation
arises, are free to consider the Sixth Circuit's decision in Equality
Foundation II and adopt the same reasoning.' 10
A. A More Narrowly Tailored Statute than Colorado's Amendment
2 May Pass Constitutional Muster
Due to the Supreme Court's emphasis in Romer of the "sheer
breadth" of Amendment 2 in declaring the measure unconstitu-
tional,"' it can reasonably be inferred from Romer alone that a nar-
rower statute may be constitutional. In fact, the Court cited several
"rational basis" cases "narrow enough in scope and grounded in a
sufficient factual context" to ascertain whether a particular measure
advances a legitimate governmental interest.11 2  Given the Court's
107 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 653 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108 Of course, as Justice Stevens points out, the denial of a writ of certiorari is not a ruling
on the merits. See Equality Foundation, 119 S. Ct. at 365 n.1 (citing Brown v. Texas, 118 S. Ct.
355, 356 (1997); Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995); and Barber v. Tennessee, 513
U.S. 1184, 1184 (1995)). But this proposition has not dampened speculation that Issue 3-type
legislation may now be passed by municipalities and will be found constitutional. See, e.g.,
Irwin, supra note 11, at A8 ("I think it sends a clear message to other municipalities and cities
that they may enact laws like Issue 3.") (quoting Michael Carvin, attorney for the Defendant in
Equality Foundation 11); Editorial, Gay Rights: Supreme Court Ruling; Cincinnati's Opinion Is
Ratified by Courts, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 18, 1998, at B2 ("What [Romer and Equality
Foundation 11] seem to say is that statewide discrimination against gays is illegal; but local
communities cannot be compelled to condone homosexual lifestyles by protecting gays with
special rights.").
109 Patrick Norton notes that the Court may have had "various political and personal reasons
for leaving these issues open for another day." Patrick J. Norton, Comment, Is Equality Foun-
dation the Latest Chapter in America's Culture War?, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 903, 928
(1998). For example, some members of the Court might have believed that the "different cir-
cumstances of [Equality Foundation 11] would weaken the Romer precedent." Id. at 928 n.205.
"0 Id. at 927-28.
11 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (finding "sheer breadth" of Amendment 2 discontinuous
with reasons offered in support of it); see also id. at 635 (noting "breadth" of amendment was so
far removed from justifications that they could not be credited).
"
2 Id. at 632 (citing New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (finding that tourism bene-
fits justified a classification favoring pushcart vendors of certain longevity); Williamson v. Lee
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recognition that the laws at issue in these cases were sustained even if
they seemed "unwise or work[ed] to the disadvantage of a particular
group, or if that rationale seem[ed] tenuous,"'1 3 one can infer that the
scope of the measures was more critical in the Court's analysis of
these cases than the justifications offered in support of the measures.
Issue 3 is certainly closer in scope than Amendment 2 to the measures
at issue in the "rational basis" cases mentioned in Romer, at least in
the sense that Issue 3 is also a local measure adopted by direct fran-
chise. This "lowest electoral subunit" distinction alone would satisfy
Justice Scalia as to the constitutionality of Issue 3-type measures.
114
Some legal commentators have also contended that Romer could
permit a more discrete measure than Amendment 2 to stand.115 But
by "discrete" they mean a measure restricted to a classification in a
particular area of law or propagated by a single governmental body
and not an across-the-board withholding of special legal protections
for homosexuals as homosexuals. Matthew Coles opines with regard
to Romer:
Because [part of the majority opinion] emphasized Amend-
ment 2's breadth and the fact that it took away the power to
protect people from discrimination, it seems most unlikely
that the Court will ever use Romer to strike down even a con-
stitutionally based but narrow restriction of the legislature's
ability to enact certain legislation-like a reporter's shield, a
prohibition on some types of regulation of banks or insurance
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (holding that assumed health concerns justified a law
favoring optometrists over opticians); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1949) (finding that potential traffic hazards justified an exemption of vehicles advertising the
owner's products from general advertising ban); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs,
330 U.S. 552 (1947) (holding that licensing scheme that disfavored persons unrelated to current
river boat pilots was justified by the possible efficiency and safety benefits of a closely knit
pilotage system).
114 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). In dissenting to the Court's decision in remanding Equality Foundation
I back to the Sixth Circuit for reconsideration in light of Romer, Justice Scalia asserted that in
contrast to Romer, Equality Foundation I
involves a determination by what appears to be the lowest electoral subunit that it
does not wish to accord homosexuals special protection. It can make that determi-
nation effective, of course, only by instructing its departments and agencies to obey
it-which is what the Cincinnati Charter Amendment does. Thus, the consequence
of holding this provision unconstitutional would be that nowhere in the country may
the people decide, in democratic fashion, not to accord special protection to homo-
sexuals.
Id.
11 See, e.g., Coles, supra note 68, at 1346; see also Seidman, supra note 5, at 83 ("The
Court [in Romer] implies that more discrete measures disadvantaging gay people, having a more
obvious connection to some legitimate government purpose, might survive rational basis re-
view.").
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companies, or even a prohibition on legislation recognizing
same sex domestic partnership.
This part of the opinion is unlikely to be applied to any-
thing much narrower than a selective anti-civil rights initia-
tive like Amendment 2.116
Of course, Coles would probably categorize Issue 3 as a "selective
anti-civil rights initiative like Amendment 2" because of its broad
proscription on any ordinances, regulations, rules or policies which
favor homosexuals because of their sexual preference. While Romer
does contain language to the effect that initiatives as broadly worded
as Amendment 2 are unconstitutional regardless of whether enacted at
the statewide or local level, 117 the fact remains that the Court did not
rehear Equality Foundation H to resolve the matter.
Moreover, the Court in Romer also took issue with that fact
Amendment 2 foreclosed homosexuals from obtaining specific
protection against discrimination in any manner other than "en-
listing the citizenry of Colorado to amend the State Constitution
or perhaps, on the State's view, by trying to pass helpful laws of
general applicability."11 8 The Sixth Circuit was careful to dis-
tinguish Issue 3 on this matter by noting that the measure only
applied at the lowest level of government and "thus could not
dispossess gay Cincirmatians of any rights derived from any
higher level of state law and enforced by a superior apparatus of
state government." 9 With this said, it is conceivable that a less
conservative court interpreting Romer could hold simply that
any laws similarly worded to Colorado's Amendment 2 are un-
constitutional regardless of the level of government they apply
to and would strike down Issue 3. But as long as the Supreme
Court remains silent on the matter, these initiatives may pass
constitutional muster if the initiative's proponents find a court
as friendly to their cause as the Sixth Circuit was in Equality
Foundation II.
116 Coles, supra note 68, at 1346.
117 Perhaps most persuasive is the Court's statement that "a law declaring that in general it
shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the govern-
ment is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense." Romer, 517 U.S.
at 633.
1 8 Id. at 631.
119 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 296-97
(6th Cir. 1997).
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B. Resolving the Unresolved Issue of "Equal Rights"
or "Special Rights": Why Creating a New Protected
Class Should Be Resisted
The Supreme Court's reasoning in declining to rehear Equality
Foundation II was that the Court does not "normally make an inde-
pendent examination of state law questions that have been resolved
by a court of appeals." 12° The question at issue was whether Issue 3
simply proscribed a municipal government from granting special
protections to homosexuals or if it removed from homosexuals essen-
tial legal protections available to the society at large. 12' While it de-
ferred to the Sixth Circuit's finding on this issue in Equality II, the
Court reserved the right to find differently in subsequent cases it
might hear.""
The Sixth Circuit based its holding, in part, on interpreting Issue 3
to eliminate only "'special class status' and 'preferential treatment'
for gays as gays under Cincinnati ordinances and policies, leaving
untouched the application, to gay citizens, of any and all legal rights
generally accorded by the municipal government to all persons as
persons."3 By contrast, the Supreme Court in Romer found "nothing
special" in the protections that Amendment 2 withheld.1 24 Because
Issue 3 and Amendment 2 are only truly distinguishable in the levels
of government they apply to, the different conclusions appear merely
to reflect a difference of opinion-acts "not of judicial judgment, but
of political will."1 5 Thus, how future cases will decide this issue is
uncertain. Another court might reasonably construe Romer to find
even a "lowest electoral subunit" measure like Issue 3 prevents ho-
mosexuals from exercising the same equal rights protections enjoyed
by the heterosexual majority. 126
There is growing sentiment in the United States that government
should refrain from creating special protections for homosexuals.
120 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 119 S. Ct. 365, 366
(1998) (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341,346-47 (1976)).
121 See id. at 365-66.
2 See id. at 366.
123 Equality Foundation, 128 F.3d at 297. For a critical analysis of the "special rights" ar-
gument, see Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Dis-
course of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283 (1994) (arguing that the "discourse of
equivalents" is misleading with respect to civil rights law).
17 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
125 Id. at 653 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126 Given that Romer did not explicitly place homosexuals in a suspect or quasi-suspect
class, such a finding would likely be based on a civil rights violation that would outweigh any
legitimate justification offered in support of the measure, even under a rational basis test.
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Some base this view on their moral convictions. Others, who "simply
sa[y] 'Stop' to the seemingly endless proliferation of protected cate-
gories that divide people into favored and disfavored classes," in-
creasingly represent the swing vote in defeating these measures. 127
This is so, according to one commentator, because the voters under-
stand that creating these categories has its consequences:
This path, taken for blacks, a truly victimized group, isn't
necessarily appropriate for other groups. And we are not sure
where it would lead. Could it provide the legal scaffolding
for gay affirmative action and quotas, or attempts to establish
same-sex marriages? No one knows....
... Few of us want gays, or anybody else, to be second-
class citizens. But when gay-rights bills come up, there's a
nagging feeling that "something cultural is going on" and that
something more than neutrality is being set in motion.
128
At issue is the right of citizens to make their own individual moral
judgment on this controversial issue and to act upon that judgment
without incurring legal penalties. Certainly Americans feel gays
should have the same rights as heterosexuals to jobs and housing, but
this alone is insufficient justification for governments to legislate on
the matter.
The problem with broad gay-rights legislation is its likelihood to
intrude into areas where Americans are not so adamant about equal
rights regardless of overt sexual preference-say, the classroom or
the local Boy Scout pack.129 Moreover, it is reasonable to believe that
most homosexuals' employment and housing needs are already being
accommodated given public sentiment and increased private inter-
127 John Leo, Gay Tolerance, Not Approval, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 3, 1993, at
20; see also Four States Deal Gay Rights Setback, supra note 14 (quoting opponent to the Fort
Collins, Colorado gay-rights ordinance as saying he thought voting down the measure "showed
most people here don't want the government to take a side in a controversial moral debate").
1 Leo, supra note 127, at 20.
129 See, e.g., Peyser, supra note 13, at 51-52. Once enacted, these laws often take on a life
of their own in the hands of zealous administrators intent on ferreting out "discrimination" in the
most private of citizens' decisions. Consider, for example, Wisconsin's "lesbian roommate
case." Katherine Dalton, Privacy and the 'Lesbian Roommate' Case, WALL ST. J., July 20,
1992, at A14. In that case, two young women, Ms. Ready and Ms. Rowe, placed an ad in the
local newspaper looking for a new roommate for the house they were renting. The women
accepted the security deposit check of another woman, Ms. Sprague, replying to the ad, but then
turned her down when the woman explicitly told them she was a lesbian. Consequently, Spra-
gue filed a complaint with the municipal equal opportunity commission alleging a violation of a
city fair housing ordinance. Finding that Ready had the authority to sublease, effectively mak-
ing her the lessor, the EOC examiner hearing the case initially found for Sprague and ordered
Ready and Rowe to pay Sprague $3,000 in damages for Sprague's emotional distress over the
incident, $300 to make up for a security deposit lost on another apartment, and Sprague's legal
fees as well. This decision was overturned on appeal by the full eleven-member EOC board, but
it was three years after the complaint was first filed. See id.
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vention. 130 Instead, efforts to enact gay-rights legislation seems more
bent on garnering society's acceptance of the gay lifestyle 131 than on
addressing critical civil rights gaps that only legal intervention alone
can fill.
The natural consequences of creating a new protected class in ho-
mosexuals for the purposes of eliminating discrimination are twofold.
First, it opens the door for further legislation to protect still other life-
styles or behavior. One can only speculate who might be next to re-
ceive protected class status-smokers, alcoholics or shoplifters per-
haps.' 2 Second, it provides the "legal scaffolding" that gay activists
need to advance their ultimate agenda: the complete legal and social
acceptance of homosexuality as a normal lifestyle. Efforts for gay
affirmative action and quotas and same-sex marriage appear more
credible with existing gay-rights legislation already on the books.
Skeptics of how far gay "equal rights" can intrude upon a nation's
collective culture and legal system need only consider the example of
our Northern neighbor, Canada, where it is becoming illegal to op-
pose or even criticize the gay rights agenda.
133
C. Dealing with the Issue of Animus: Moral Disapproval of
Homosexuality As Not Per Se Irrational
In Romer, the Court stated that Amendment 2's breadth was so
discontinuous with the reasons offered in support of it that the
"amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the
class that it effects."' 34  One of the reasons offered in support of
Amendment 2 was "respect for other citizens' freedom of association,
130 See, e.g., Schacter, supra note 6, at 409 (noting that an "increasing number of corporate
employers are adopting antidiscrimination policies in the absence of laws, and IBM recently
joined a growing list of companies offering domestic partnership benefits (like health insurance
coverage) to gay employees and their partners").
131 See, e.g., id. (asserting that political process must play a role in "eradicating the coerced
invisibility and continuing subordination of gay men and lesbians"); see also note 15 and ac-
companying text.
132 See Gay Rights: Supreme Court Ruling; Cincinnati's Opinion Is Ratified By Courts, su-
pra note 108, at B2.
133 Dr. James Dobson of Focus on the Family reports that several Canadian provinces have
laws that prohibit publication of statements deemed "discriminatory" towards homosexuality.
Focus on the Family, FAM. NEWS FROM DR. JAMES DOBSON (Focus on the Family, Colorado
Springs, Colo.), June 1998, at 4. Additionally, the Canadian equivalent of the United States'
FCC monitors programming that portrays homosexuality negatively. See id. As a consequence,
religious broadcasters expounding upon Romans 1, for example, or other Bible passages con-
demning homosexuality can be charged with unethical practices by Canadian officials inter-
preting their message as hateful. Focus on the Family could not even air certain medical infor-
mation related to AIDS on a recent broadcast because it might be found offensive to Canadian
homosexuals. See Focus on the Family, supra note 41, at 4.
134 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
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and in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have per-
sonal or religious objections to homosexuality."' 135  Consequently,
some authors commenting on Romer have posited that because of the
Court's "animus" statement, it recharacterized mere moral disap-
proval of homosexuality as "irrational animosity."' 36 If this interpre-
tation is accurate, then initiatives of a type like Issue 3 are invalid un-
der Romer because they are often defended in the name of traditional
moral values. 137
The Court in Romer held that the breadth of Amendment 2 was
"so far removed from these particular justifications that we find it
impossible to credit them."'138 The Court did not, however, say that
any justification-including mere moral disapproval-was per se ir-
rational. 139  Thus, an initiative of a more discrete scope might still
pass the rational basis test employed in Romer based on the same jus-
tifications. 14 Supporting this interpretation, the court in Equality
Foundation II found the expression of the community's moral disap-
proval of homosexuality to be an "equally justifiable" community
interest on par with associational liberty and conserving scarce re-
sources. 141  Justice Stevens's opinion with respect to the denial of
certiorari did not speak to this issue, leaving the Sixth Circuit's inter-
pretation viable.
135 Id. at 635.
136 Seidman, supra note 5, at 85, 101; see also Coles, supra note 68, at 1352 (asserting that
"[s]aying that dislike of a group is based in morality or religion does not transform disliking the
group into a legitimate explanation for discrimination"). Other authors are less convinced about
the Court's drastic recharacterization of motives. See, e.g., Schacter, supra note 6, at 381 ("After
Romer, it appears that something more than bare condemnation of homosexuality must be mar-
shalled in defense of anti-gay measures challenged on equal protection grounds, but the opinion
does not delineate exactly what that something is.").
137 A defense in the name of traditional moral values holds that an initiative may legiti-
mately be based upon "broader respect for, and agreement with, persons who have generalized
'personal or religious objections to homosexuality' and, therefore, object to the recognition or
encouragement of the practice in any context." Seidman, supra note 5, at 101.138 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
139 The Sixth Circuit in Equality Foundation 11 observed that "[a]lthough the Romer Court
never rejected associational liberty and the expression of community moral disapproval of ho-
mosexuality as rational bases supporting an enactment denying privileged treatment to homo-
sexuals, it concluded that under the facts and circumstances of Romer, the state's argument in
support of Colorado Amendment 2 was not credible." Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati,
Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 300-01 (1997).
140 See discussion supra Part III(A).
141 Equality Foundation, 128 F.3d at 301. The Sixth Circuit further noted that the Romer
Court "resolved that the deferential 'rational relationship' test, that declared the constitutional
validity of a statute or ordinance if it rationally furthered any conceivable valid public interest,
was the correct point of departure for the evaluation of laws which uniquely burdened the inter-
ests of homosexuals." Id. at 294. Mark Papadopoulos opines that Romer "did influence [Equal-
ity Foundation 11] but rather than compelling the invalidation of Issue 3 by force of logic, Romer
directly led to a second upholding of the amendment by cementing rational basis review as the
appropriate standard of review for [Equality Foundation II] and many homosexual rights cases
to come." Papadopoulos, supra note 26, at 200.
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Conceivably, as Justice Scalia suggested in his dissent to Romer,
the Court took sides with the "knights" in the culture war over the gay
agenda rather than with the "villeins."142 Gay activists often paint
moral conservatives as "homophobic," "hateful," and "bigoted."
143
The proponents of Issue 3 were not immune from such characteriza-
tion.' 44 Nonetheless, disapproval of homosexual practices is not
rooted in either hate or animus. It is instead rooted on sound theo-
logical doctrine145 and, as Justice Scalia noted, the same sort of disap-
142 Romer, 517 U.S. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143 Focus on the Family, supra note 133, at 3. Not surprisingly, where moral conservatives
are excoriated by gay activists and the popular media for their beliefs, pro-gay-rights commen-
tators may engage in much more scornful discourse without fearing backlash. Consider the
comments of Elizabeth Birch of the Human Rights Campaign made at a fundraising dinner with
respect to a stroke suffered by Focus on the Family's Dr. Dobson, a vocal critic of the gay
agenda. Birch said:
I don't know how much I believe in acts of God, and I don't think we've seen the
meteorites or hurricanes that were predicted, but it is true that within 24 hours of
[Senator Trent Lott's] anti-gay comment, the head of Focus on the Family suffered a
stroke that hit his speech center and silenced him for 12 hours. I think if ever I was
looking for a sign from God, that would be it.
Focus on the Family, supra note 41, at 6. Dr. Dobson queries in response to this statement,
"Can you imagine any of us at [Focus on the Family] making a statement like this gloating over
someone being stricken with a stroke and being unable to speak?" Id. Given the gay move-
ment's claim to oppose hate, this statement by Birch is the height of hypocrisy.
144 See, e.g., Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp.
417, 422 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (citing the most notorious aspect of the plaintiff gays' campaign
against Issue 3 as "their ubiquitous 'Hitler-KKK-McCarthey' billboards appearing around the
City"); Irwin, supra note 11, at Al, A8 (quoting a gay as asserting that Cincinnati is "an island
of intolerance" and an Issue 3 proponent as observing "[the gays] lost Issue 3 and continued to
fight, and we're still the mean-spirited ones"); see also Four States Deal Gay Rights Setback,
supra note 14 (quoting a same-sex marriage proponent as stating that after such a measure was
voted down in their state, "[iut's the first time in my civil rights career that I have encountered so
much deep-rooted prejudice and discrimination against a group of people").
145 In addition to specific references to homosexuality in Scripture, the standard for human
sexuality relied on throughout the Bible is set forth in Genesis 2:24 (New International): "For
this reason a man will leave his father and his mother and be united to his wife, and they will
become one flesh." Dr. Dobson has this to say about homosexuality and the biblical text:
Try as we might, we cannot make any other behaviors-premarital intercourse,
adultery, prostitution, male and female homosexuality-conform with what God has
decreed from the beginning. The book of Leviticus issues this decree about homo-
sexual behavior "Thou shalt not lie with mankind as with womankind; it is abomi-
nation." Why is the wording so emphatic? Theologians tell us it is because sexual
deviancy distorts God's original intention and corrupts the relationship between men,
women and their Creator. When God looked at His arrangement in the Garden, he
calied it "good." There is nothing in Scripture that provides a basis for making this
pronouncement on any other form of sexual expression.
Focus on the Family, supra note 133, at 1-2 (citation omitted). Contrary to the scornful charac-
terization by many gay activists of the theological motivations of many Christian groups, their
message is not one of hate. Rather, from the perspective of most evangelical Christians, the
hope for the homosexual that is found in Jesus Christ is first, forgiveness, see 1 John 1:9, and
second, the opportunity to change their behavior, see, e.g., 2 Corinthians 5:17 (New Interna-
tional) ("[Ihf anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation; the old has gone, the new has come!").
Even in the early Christian church, it was recognized that forgiveness and change is available as
much to the homosexual as any other person. See, e.g., 1 Corinthians 6:9-11 (New International)
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proval that "produced the centuries-old criminal laws [the Supreme
Court] held constitutional in Bowers."' 46 Moral conservatives who
oppose laws that favor gays do so out of moral principle and strongly-
held religious convictions, not out of hate for those who practice ho-
mosexuality. Their goal is the preservation of the traditional family
structure.147 It may seem an outdated concept to some and unpopular
to others, such as the powers that be in Washington, D.C., the popular
media and Hollywood, but it is a stance that increasingly is being em-
braced by middle America in turning away gay-rights legislation.14
8
The disparagement of moral conservatives by pro-gay forces con-
tinues to reach new and ever more preposterous heights. Now, some
gay activists and media and print personalities are suggesting that
certain conservative religious and political groups should share the
blame for violent acts committed against homosexuals because they
create an "anti-homosexual climate" that incite violence. 149 John Leo
("Do not be deceived: Neither the sexually immoral nor idolaters nor male prostitutes nor ho-
mosexual offenders nor thieves nor the greedy nor drunkards nor slanderers nor swindlers will
inherit the kingdom of God. And that is what some of you were. But you were washed, you
were sanctified, you were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and by the Spirit of our
God.") (emphasis added).
It should be clear that the position taken above is grounded on a literalist interpretation of
the Bible. Certainly, there are some in the "religious community" who would debate whether
the Judeo-Christian tradition requires the moral condemnation of homosexual practices. See,
e.g., J.F. Walsh, Jr., First Amendment Protection of Homosexual Conduct, 48 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 381,402 n.104 (1998).
146 Romer, 517 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Robert Bork writes that
"[mioral objection to homosexual practices is not the same thing as animus, unless all disap-
provals based on morality are to be disallowed as mere animus." ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING
TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 113 (1996).
147 See Focus on the Family, supra note 133, at4.
148 Opponents of a Maine gay-rights initiative obtained its repeal by focusing on a morality
argument as contrasted with an "equal rights, not special rights" argument. "Technically, it does
have to do with special rights ... but if you scratch the surface, it's a moral concern," said the
president of a group that opposed the law. Peyser, supra note 13, at 51.
149 Headlining the group is Katie Couric of NBC's Today show. With respect to the beating
death of gay college student Matthew Shepard, Couric asked Wyoming Governor Jim Geringer
whether he believed, as some gay activists did, that the
Christian Coalition, the Family Research Council, and Focus on Family [sic] are
contributing to this anti-homosexual atmosphere by having an ad campaign saying,
"If you are a homosexual, you can change your orientation." That prompts people to
say, "If I meet someone who's a homosexual, I'm going to take action and try to
convince them and try to harm them." Do you believe such groups are contributing
to this climate?
Focus on the Family, supra note 41, at 1-2. Couric later returned to this topic and addressed it
at greater length the next day with Elizabeth Birch of the Human Rights Campaign. See id. at 2.
Couric neither quoted the "offending" groups nor documented the charges against them. Id. at 4;
see also Jonathan Alter, Trickle-Down Hate, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 26, 1998, at 44 ("But just as the
white racists created a climate for lynching blacks, just as hate radio created a climate for mili-
tias, so the constant degrading of homosexuals is exacting a toll in blood.").
Incidentally, the media campaign referenced by Couric made the point that it is possible for
some homosexuals to come out of the gay lifestyle and into healthy heterosexual relationships.
See Focus on the Family, supra note 41, at 3. Some homosexuals are unhappy with the life they
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observes that using the "climate" argument, a familiar political device
once commonly used against the left, but now used almost exclu-
sively by the left,150 has certain political advantages.
fflou can discredit principled opposition without bothering
to engage it. All you have to do is connect the pope, your lo-
cal rabbi, or any other adversary to a gruesome murder, and
your work is done. Seen through the lens of "bias" (often no
more than disagreement with the value system of the cultural
left), the pope and the shooters start to merge in the minds of
rational people. 151
Leo continues: "Beware of arguments based on climates or atmos-
pheres. Most of them are simply attempts to disparage opponents and
squelch legitimate debate."
152
If a court agreed that opposing the gay rights agenda is merely
spite and creates a "climate" that incites violence, the popular will of
the American people would be undermined. Legislators can not be
relied upon to oppose the gay agenda. Because of the political clout
of homosexual activists, few leaders from either political party, or
anyone else of visibility or influence for that matter, will speak out in
fear of being branded "politically incorrect 153 or, even worse, "intol-
erant. ' 154 Citizens with the moral courage to oppose the gay rights
agenda should not be foreclosed from doing so because some judges
do not share their views.155 While not explicitly adopting the "disap-
proval is hate" or "climate' arguments, the Court in Romer leaves the
door open for future cases to do so.
are leading and sincerely do want to change. Religious conviction is widely recognized as a
means to such change. As psychologist Patricia Hannigan said in Newsweek: "If the foremost
priority in one's life is religious faith, then personal happiness might come from conforming to
faith rather than from pursuing sexual orientation." Miller & Leland, supra note 41, at 50.
150 See John Leo, Avoid 'Climate' Control, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 9, 1998, at 20.
151 Id.
152 i.
153 Focus on the Family, supra note 133, at 3.
154 Jonathan Alter remarks that in today's America, "the only true way to be ostracized by
society... is to be too close-minded. The intolerant aren't tolerated." Jonathan Alter, In the
Time of Tolerance: When It Comes To Sex in This Nonjudgmental Age, Nobody Wants to StartCasting Stones, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 30, 1998, at 29.
15 Patrick Norton also asserts that
[t]he implication that the Supreme Court can and should "determine" the "motives"
behind the enactment of legislation, particularly voter referendums such as Issue 3, is
frightening. This would allow the Court to invalidate almost any legislature that dis-
favors a group based entirely on the Court's assessment of the motives for enacting
it.
Norton, supra note 109, at 929; see also James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142 (1971) ("[A]
lawmaking procedure that 'disadvantages' a particular group does not always deny equal pro-
tection. Under any such holding, presumably a State would not be able to require referendums
on any subject.., because they would always disadvantage some group.").
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V. CONCLUSION
Whether Romer v. Evans ushers in a new era of gay equality or is
merely a pyrrhic victory for gay activists remains to be determined.
Because of the Supreme Court's vagueness in Romer, future courts
hearing gay-rights suits are free to read the case either broadly or nar-
rowly. Equality Foundation H construed Romer narrowly as only
striking down broad statewide initiatives like Colorado's Amendment
2, leaving more narrow local initiatives like Issue 3 standing. Fur-
thermore, Equality Foundation II read Romer as solidifying rational
basis review as the proper measure of the constitutionality for initia-
tives like Issue 3. What is now certain after the Supreme Court de-
clined to review the Sixth Circuit's decision in Equality Foundation 11
is that measures similar to Issue 3 may pass constitutional muster, at
least until the Court rules determinatively on the issue of the allow-
able scope of such measures. But courts are free to decide otherwise
as well. Notwithstanding Equality Foundation II, the Court's tenor
towards homosexuals changed substantially with Romer, so that a
liberal judiciary at odds with a public less willing to make homosexu-
als the legal and social equals of heterosexuals will likely be com-
monplace from now on.
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t I am grateful to Prof. George Dent for providing helpful comments on an earlier version of
this Comment. I also wish to thank my wife Brenda for much patience, love and support during
the law school experience, as well as my family and my wife's family for the same. "May I
never boast except in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, through which the world has been
crucified to me, and I to the world." Galatians 6:14 (New International).
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